Why developmental psychology is incomplete without comparative and cross-cultural perspectives by Nielsen, Mark & Haun, Daniel
  1 
Why Developmental Psychology is Incomplete Without 
Comparative and Cross-Cultural Perspectives 
 
 
Mark Nielsen1,2 and Daniel Haun3 
1. School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia 
2. Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa 
3. Department of Early Child Development and Culture, University of Leipzig, 
Germany 
 
 
*Author for correspondence:  
Associate Professor Mark Nielsen 
School of Psychology  
University of Queensland  
Brisbane, QLD, 4072, Australia  
Email: nielsen@psy.uq.edu.au  
 
Acknowledgements 
Writing of this manuscript was supported by an Australian Research Council 
Discovery Project Grant (DP140101410).  
 
  
  2 
Abstract 
As a discipline, developmental psychology has a long history of relying on animal 
models and data collected among distinct cultural groups to enrich and inform 
theories of the ways social and cognitive processes unfold through the lifespan. 
However, approaches that draw together developmental, cross-cultural and 
comparative perspectives remain rare. The need for such an approach is reflected in 
the papers by Heyes, Call and Schmelz, and Keller in this Special Issue. Here we 
incorporate these papers into a review of recent research endeavours covering a 
range of core aspects of social cognition, including social learning, cooperation and 
collaboration, prosociality, and theory of mind. In so doing, we aim to highlight how 
input from comparative and cross-cultural empiricism has altered our perspectives 
of human development, and, in particular, led to a deeper understanding of the 
evolution of the human cultural mind.  
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“…the origins of humans’ social nature and cognition are found in infancy 
and childhood, placing social cognitive development at center stage in 
understanding the evolution of the human mind” (1). 
 
Once considered the sole domain of humans, the notion that other animals engage 
in behaviours that are culturally determined has gained increasing traction in the 
last decade (2-13). Among the debate that has sprung from new assertions 
surrounding animal culture is the characterisation of humans as not just cultural but 
‘ultra’ cultural. In contrast to non-human culture, human culture is: (i) cumulative, 
i.e. innovations are progressively incorporated into a population’s stock of skills and 
knowledge, generating ever more sophisticated repertoires; (ii) more distinctly 
variable across communities; and (iii) to a larger extent shaped through social 
learning (14-16).  
Conveniently setting aside the damage human cultural behaviour has caused 
the planet and the unconscionable extinction we have brought to those with whom 
we once shared it, our capacity for cumulative innovation of highly diverse and 
contextually adaptive social and physical ways of doing things, is remarkable and 
unparalleled in any other species. This success is not so much a product of any 
change in our mental capacities to understand the physical world, but rather in our 
capacities and strategies to navigate our social world (17-20). The key to 
understanding humans, both as individuals and as a species, thus lies in 
understanding how we create and navigate culture - the constructed social and 
physical environment that hosts each of us. Here we argue that identifying the 
foundations of this cultural capacity relies on investigating the differences between 
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human and non-human social capacities and strategies, the ontogeny of those 
strategies and abilities and their local instantiations across different cultural 
settings. Only the combination of those perspectives will enable us to understand 
the roots of human culture.  
 Critically, while the comparison of children’s performance across ages is part 
of the standard toolset of psychology, comparison between human and non-human 
performance and comparisons across human cultures remain relatively rare, and the 
combination of both all but absent (21). The papers contributed by Heyes, Call and 
Schmelz, and Keller, as a collective, demonstrate the inordinate value accrued to 
attempts at understanding the evolution of the human mind by collating research 
endeavours from developmental, comparative and cross-cultural psychology. Our 
aim here is to build on this triadic approach, to argue for its value and to provide 
insight into some of the key elements that make us who we are: Social learning, 
cooperation, prosociality and understanding of other minds. 
 
Social Learning. 
It appears intuitive that any search for an account of human (as opposed to 
non-human) culture would include a model of human (as opposed to non-human) 
social learning. Humans are profoundly adept at acquiring information from others, 
and do so habitually when confronted with the need or desire to acquire new skills 
or behaviours. Our social learning skills are established early in life, as exemplified 
by demonstrations that infants as young as 6-months can learn new actions, and by 
12-months can learn to construct simple tools, just by observing others (22). The 
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capacity and tendency for social learning only increases from this age, so much in 
fact that children engage in what has come to be known as overimitation (23).  
When children overimitate they copy all elements an adult used when 
engaging with a novel object, including actions that are obviously causally unrelated 
to any potential outcome. In the first study to chart its emergence, 12-, 18-, and 24-
month-old children watched an adult retrieve a toy from a closed box by 
disengaging a latch located on the front of it (24). Although the box could be easily 
opened by hand, the adult complicated the demonstration by using a miscellaneous 
object. After observing the adult demonstrator, 12-month-olds infants ignored the 
demonstrated method and attempted to open the box by hand. In stark contrast, 
24-month-olds overwhelmingly attempted to open the box using the object, 
commonly persisting in this comparatively inefficient approach to such an extent 
that they failed to successfully open the box.  
Subsequent studies have documented overimitation across multiple labs 
(25-29) and in an increasing number of cultural groups (30-32). Indeed, the 
inclination to overimitate becomes so extreme that as they enter their preschool 
years children will replicate novel, modelled actions for a naïve adult, in the absence 
of the model (i.e., where one can assume motivation to appease a teacher has been 
reduced) and, perhaps most critically, including actions occurring after the ostensive 
goal has been achieved (e.g., wiping a stick across the top of a box after the box has 
been opened and a toy inside is easily available for retrieval) (33). 
Cultural differences in social learning proclivities and processes have been 
documented (e.g., 34, 35). It nevertheless appears that overimitation is a widely 
shared feature of human social learning, transcending contexts (for an exception 
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see 36). Given the cross-culturally common, stable early onset of overimitation in 
social learning, it is conceivable that it is an enabling species-specific condition for 
human culture. Developmental and cross-cultural data alone, however, are not 
sufficient to make such a case. Overimitation would also have to be specific to 
human social learning. That is, be less pronounced or absent in other closely related 
species, such as for example the non-human great apes. 
In their now seminal work, Horner and Whiten (37) had an adult 
demonstrator show 3- to 4-year-old human children and young, wild born, captive 
chimpanzees how to obtain a reward from a novel box by first poking a stick into a 
hole on top and then into a hole at the bottom of the box. Because the box was 
opaque the participants could not see how the actions occurring inside the box were 
causally related to the outcome. When given their own turn with the box, both 
chimpanzees and children copied all of the demonstrated actions. Next the opaque 
box was swapped with a transparent version whereby the effect of each internal 
action could be identified, rendering it obvious that as the stick was inserted into 
the top hole it struck a barrier and made no contact with that part of the box from 
which the reward could be retrieved. That is, the action involving the top hole had 
no causal relation to the outcome. Under this new circumstance the chimpanzees 
ignored the initial action which was now visibly, causally irrelevant. In contrast, the 
children replicated the model’s entire sequence of actions, including the obviously 
irrelevant insertion of the stick into the top hole (see also 38). This data further 
supports the account that overimitation is a species-specific enabling condition for 
human culture. In this way the triadic approach combining developmental, cross-
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cultural and comparative comparisons has provided part of the puzzle of human 
culture that was unattainable in the absence of any of the three.  
The natural next question is how this difference in overimitation comes 
about. Does the apparent lack of overimitation in non-human animals suggest a 
fundamental, heritable discontinuity between human and non-human social 
learning abilities? Attempting an answer to this question brings us to Heyes’s review 
of the debate between AIM and ASL accounts of imitation. As Heyes notes, one of 
the key points of contention between these perspectives is whether there is a 
species-specific genetically inherited ‘module’ for imitation or if there is continuity, 
with our “prodigious imitative capacity … due primarily to the rich resources 
provided by our sociocultural environments”?  
Again, the triadic approach can provide insight. First, Horner and Whiten’s 
comparison between humans and chimpanzees amply show that our closest living 
relatives have the ability to learn from others, but the approach of Pan troglodytes 
to social learning is more pragmatic than Homo sapiens. Put simply, information 
provided by others is no more or less relevant than individually acquired information 
(39) and causally irrelevant actions are treated as that: Irrelevant. If there is no 
functional purpose to copying an action it wont be copied. Human children, in 
contrast, consider information provided by others more readily (39) and attach 
significance to non-functional details of a demonstration. Hence, difference in social 
learning might not be primarily due to a discontinuity in the ability to learn from 
others, but a difference in the motivations underlying human and chimpanzee social 
learning. While chimpanzees learn from others with a focus on functionality, 
humans learn from others with an added focus on the social consequences of social 
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learning (See Over, this issue; 17, 18, 40-43). Approaching the same question from a 
developmental perspective, as already noted above, children do not overimitate 
until their second year, and growing evidence suggests they indeed do so because 
of social and/or normative reasons (26, 40, 44-50). Finally, the fact that 
overimitation occurs across multiple contrasting cultural contexts (30-32) indicates 
that the sociocultural environment serving as a resource for acquiring human-
specific overimitation in social learning is shared across most human communities.  
A similar pattern of evidence can be found in another aspect of social 
learning: the influence of the majority on individuals’ social learning. A recent study 
in chimpanzees and human children showed that if individuals have no prior 
information available they copy the behaviour of the majority over alternatives, 
even if the alternatives are equally frequent, equally familiar and equally productive 
(51). Humans however will even abandon a behaviour or judgment they know to be 
effective or correct to one that others have demonstrated, an effect dubbed 
“conformity” (52-54). Although some researchers have claimed to demonstrate 
human-like conformity in non-human primates (55-58), these studies have, as yet, 
failed to exclude a variety of alternative explanations that are independent of a 
majority effect such as primacy effects, conservatism, incomplete sampling and 
random copying (59-61). Similar to the case of overimitation this difference is likely 
not due to a fundamental discontinuity in the consideration of majority information 
in social learning, but to a difference in motivational focus. While chimpanzees copy 
the majority when acquiring a new skill, a highly adaptive strategy (62), they will not 
follow the majority if they have a different but equally productive strategy available 
to them (63, 64). Humans follow the majority even in the latter scenario, but, and 
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this is crucial, only if they are under public scrutiny - if they are allowed to act in 
private, without being observed by the majority, rates of conformity decline (52, 63, 
65). Hence, again, social considerations appear to drive the difference between 
human and non-human social learning. Similar to overimitation, conformity is, 
although variable in extent, pervasive across cultures (66) and occurs early in 
development (63, 65, 67, 68). Taken together, in contrast to chimpanzees, human 
children appear to integrate social consideration into their social learning strategies, 
increasingly as they grow up, creating a rift between human and non-human social 
learning and, in consequence, human and non-human culture. 
 
Cooperation and Collaboration 
Another key component in the emergence of human culture has been the 
evolution of shared intentionality which arises in collaborative interactions where 
participants have a collective goal and coordinated action roles for pursuing that 
goal (69, 70). It is argued that these characteristics have been core in the ‘socio-
cognitive niche’ that underwrote the evolutionary shaping of our species (20). 
Indeed, from early in life children seek joint activity with others (71) and learn 
through the interactions that arise, and in this way they develop the skills and 
proclivities for collaborating that are a core feature of human culture (72, 73). For 
example, Brownell and colleagues (74)  presented 18- and 30-month-olds with a task 
that required collaboration to work together in operating separate handles 
embedded in an apparatus that were too far apart for one child to operate alone. 
Pulling the handles together activated an animated musical toy. Whereas 
coordinated activity in the younger children was sparse, the 30-month-olds 
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monitored and accommodated their partner’s activity and location, working 
together to achieve the joint goal. More recently Dean and colleagues (75) reported 
that, when presented with a task requiring multiple steps to solve, children were far 
more cooperative than chimpanzees. They worked together, shared solutions and 
achieved better outcomes.  
Across different human populations, children’s early cooperative abilities are 
often described as highly similar. While children in different cultures might differ 
when and to what extent they choose to be cooperative (76, 77), and what rules of 
conduct apply within a given cooperative scenario (78), children appear to show 
similar cooperative abilities at similar ages across cultures. Callaghan and colleagues 
(35) for example report highly similar performance across distinct cultures in various 
collaborative tasks in early childhood.  
Thus, given the relevance of cooperation for human culture and the early 
onset and the absence of cross-cultural variation, should we consider collaboration 
to be an enabling condition for uniquely human culture? If so, we might expect it to 
be in parts a human autopomorphy, something unique to our species. As Schmelz 
and Call detail, the answer to the above question is a qualified ‘no’. The qualification 
is that there needs to be a reward or incentive of some kind to motivate 
collaboration in chimpanzees. Children, on the other hand, can be sufficiently 
motivated by opportunities for social interaction (71). As already alluded to, this 
inclination to collaborate can differ depending on the child’s cultural background 
(32, 76, 79). The triangulation, in this case specifically the detailed analysis of the 
comparison between human and non-human cooperation forces us into a more 
nuanced interpretation of the relevance of human cooperation for explaining 
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uniquely human culture - and again, it appears a difference in motivation rather 
than a fundamental difference in capacity.   
 
Prosociality 
The differences between chimpanzees and children in their approach to 
collaborative tasks also extends to prosocial acts. Indeed, the prosocial proclivity of 
infants and young children has been well documented (80). By 12 months of age 
infants begin to provide helpful information to others (81), at 15 months they will 
share a toy with an unfamiliar adult (82), and by 18 months they are capable of 
providing instrumental help; that is, helping another achieve a goal (83). Moving 
further into childhood, Brownell, Svetlova & Nichols (84) presented 18- and 25-
month-old infants with a task requiring them to pull one of two handles attached to 
a pair of trays in order to obtain a reward. Pulling one of the handles delivered a 
loaded tray to the child and to an adult confederate, whereas pulling the alternative 
handle delivered a loaded tray to the child only. The 25-month-old children chose 
the prosocial option, delivering food to themselves and the adult, significantly more 
than the 18-month-olds, with the latter needing more verbal cues from the adult to 
recognize the joint goal available. House, Henrich, Brosnan and Silk (85) used a 
similar design with 3- to 8-year-olds, finding high levels of prosocial behaviour with 
the younger children performing at similar levels to the older children, suggesting 
that spontaneous prosocial behaviour becomes firmly established through the 
childhood period. Moreover, there is growing evidence that children will help others 
when it comes at a personal cost (86, 87). 
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Adding a cross-cultural comparison to this developmental data however, 
forces us to assume a more refined position. The ontogenetic affirmation of 
prosocial behaviour is culture-specific. In a comparison across a diverse set of 
communities House et al. (88) found that, while children in all communities enter 
society with a similar prosocial tendency, they will, as they grow older, adjust their 
behaviour to the cross-culturally variable prosocial norms of their community. 
Reflecting this, in an intriguing study Blake and colleagues (89) probed reactions to 
disadvantageous inequity aversion (DI – the avoidance of receiving less than a peer) 
and advantageous inequity aversion (AI – the avoidance of receiving more than a 
peer) in children aged 4 to 9 years across seven distinct cultures (Canada, India, 
Mexico, Peru, Senegal, Uganda and the US). DI was present in all societies, with 
cultural variance in its age of emergence, appearing earliest in the US and Canada, 
latest in Mexico. Moreover, AI emerged only in the US, Canada and Uganda, and in 
these societies increased with age as children approached adolescence.  
These culture-specific pathways in children’s prosocial behaviour and 
reactions to unfairness are likely the result of variable socialization strategies that 
aim to support different culture-specific goals. In this issue the paper by Keller lays 
this point out in intriguing detail. Children, socialized into societies with a high 
appreciation of relatedness instil in their children an urgency of sharing with others 
in ways in which societies with a strong emphasis on autonomy will not. 
Nonetheless, as of today, the human tendency to help stands in stark 
contrast to the behaviour of chimpanzees who, as detailed by Call and Schmelz, 
require some kind of incentive to aid others. In comparison to human children, even 
those that grow up in cultures with less emphasis on prosocial norms, chimpanzees 
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appear limited in their tendency to help others. As is the case with their imitative 
proclivities, in chimpanzees social factors are not a driving motivation to cooperate. 
What is missing is any kind of shared intentionality as expressed in truly 
collaborative and joint attentional activities where participants have a joint goal and 
joint attention (90). According to Moll and Tomasello (91) interactions involving 
shared intentionality transform human cognition in fundamental ways. First and 
most fundamentally, it creates the notion of perspective. Consider how infants 
might come to understand that another person might see the same situation as 
they do, but from a different perspective. This in turn paves the way for what may 
be called, very generally, collective intentionality (92) and from these foundations 
spring a core human capacities for understanding others and for the development of 
what is known as a theory of mind. 
 
Theory of Mind 
The term ‘theory of mind’ refers to a kind of ‘commonsense understanding’ 
of the world (93, 94) that involves the appreciation that oneself and others are 
beings who possess a range of mental states such as thoughts, beliefs and desires, 
and that it is these mental states that determine behaviour (95). People act towards 
the world not as it really is, but how they perceive or believe it to be. To gain a 
comprehensive theory of mind a child needs to understand that people’s mental 
states can be different from their own, from others and from reality. That is, the 
mental states of others are partly derived from their knowledge of events and this 
knowledge is gained through different sources.  
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Based on this reasoning, tasks used to assess understanding of 'false-beliefs' 
in others have become the standard tool used to index the child's developing 
"theory of mind". In a typical task children are introduced to an Agent X, placing 
his/her favourite toy inside Box 1 and then leaving the test environment. Agent Y is 
then introduced, who takes the toy from Box 1, plays with it and then leaves after 
putting it in Box 2. Agent X then returns and children are asked where he/she will 
first look for the toy. In Western societies children from around 4 years of age give a 
correct response (Box 1) while younger children typically respond incorrectly that 
Agent X will first look in Box 2, i.e. where the object is ‘now’.  In non-Western 
societies, some studies report synchrony in the onset of false belief (96, 97), 
whereas other studies have found considerable variation (98). 
More important than the question of variation in the onset of false belief 
reasoning is the insight that Theory of Mind does not just emerge suddenly at 
around 4 years with the onset of success on false belief tasks. Wellman and Liu (99) 
showed that between the ages of around 2 and 6 years, Western children go 
through a developmental progression in which they master different mental state 
concepts via a sequence of steps. These steps include understanding that people 
can like or dislike similar things (Diverse Desires) and have different opinions and 
beliefs about the same situation (Diverse Beliefs), appreciation that others might 
not have access to the right information (Knowledge Access), a grasp of false belief, 
and knowing that they can deliberately hide how they feel (Hidden Emotions). 
Critically, application of the Wellman and Liu scale has revealed cross-cultural 
differences in the sequence in which each of these steps is mastered. For example 
Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, and Wellman (100) found that Iranian children 
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outperformed their Australian peers with regard to understanding knowledge 
access while lagging in their understanding of diverse belief (see also 101). A similar 
developmental was reported in comparisons of Chinese versus American children 
(102). Hence, while undoubtedly humans acquire the skill to understand others’ 
false beliefs, they get there via a variable, and as of yet poorly understood, 
trajectory. If we were to consider false belief understanding as a species-specific 
enabling condition for human culture, we would predict the absence of such abilities 
in other closely related species.  
In their engaging paper, Call and Schmelz provide an excellent review of the 
research endeavours expended in attempting to find evidence of Theory of Mind in 
nonhuman primates. Their review leads them to conclude: “… it remains possible 
that chimpanzees simply have not been confronted with the appropriate context in 
which they might pass a false belief test yet. It is also possible that this specific skill 
is unique to humans”. In this context, we reiterate the need for continued cross-
pollination between disciplines. To the best of our knowledge, a primate version of 
the Wellman and Liu scale is yet to be developed. There are obvious challenges to 
this, but if achievable it would shed considerable light on the mind reading 
capacities of our closest living relatives, simultaneously promising to yield insight 
into human capacities.  
 
Conclusions 
Our aim here has been to highlight how a deeper understanding of the 
human cultural mind can best be derived from approaches that incorporate 
investigation of the differences between human and non-human social capacities 
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and strategies, the ontogeny of those strategies and abilities and their local 
instantiations across different cultural settings. We hope the message is deeper 
than this though: The ever-growing corpus of literature devoted to charting our 
psychological development through the life-span continues to expand our 
knowledge of how nature and nurture interact to make us who we are, from the 
individual to the species. This literature provides firm footing for identifying 
patterns of atypical development and how interventions may work to ameliorate 
associated symptoms. However, this literature also frequently operates isolated 
from research undertaken in related disciplines, and does so at its own detriment. 
Failure to understand what is species- and/or culturally-specific leaves a possibly 
skewed, potentially inaccurate and certainly incomplete picture. It is time for a new 
approach to developmental psychology that fully integrates contemporary research 
efforts spanning WEIRD populations (103, 104), non-WEIRD populations and non-
human animals (primate or otherwise). This approach is powerful for many reasons: 
Adopting it will help ameliorate rising concerns over the lack of stability and 
reproducibility of findings in psychology generally (105) and developmental 
psychology specifically (106), will enrich all disciplines and provide a critical pathway 
broadening insight into how we have become who we are, and will ultimately yield 
unique insights into the evolution of the mind.   
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